TL 5690

Ad informationem confidentialem

[redacted] For immediate distribution on a completely non attributable basis.

The following report was compiled in Kupang, Timor, and is dated 25 Sept. I personally find it substantially correct. I have corrected one or two details (the military command is moving from Dili not to Ende but to Maumere; not 200 churches burnt down, nearer five-hundred). I have also added my own analysis where it differs from that of the author (Islamisation is probably not a direct goal, but rather fanatical religious elements are being used for the destabilisation of East Nusa Tenggara for economic and political ends). Once again: If you use this material, remember it is on a totally unattributable basis. I think the important points are:

1] East Timor is "yesterday's" focus; today's is West Timor and the other islands where East Timorese have been deported and are now being intimidated and even murdered.

2] East Nusa Tenggara (West Timor, Flores and Sumba) have now been targeted as the next areas for destabilisation. This is where 35% of Indonesian Catholics live and the second biggest Protestant Church is (Evangelical Church of Timor). West Timor and Flores are being overrun with the army and is being systematically destabilised.

3] East Timor should not be seen as an isolated incident; it needs to be understood as part of the overall strategy of the Jakarta military elite to survive and prosper. Thus, it is utterly absurd to soft peddle East Timor to "assist" the "democratic" process in Jakarta.

4] We should remember the economic stake of "Soeharto Inc." in the western part of East Timor including oil (land and off-shore deposits), sandalwood, coffee and marble. A war has begun to regain this territory (8 districts) for Jakarta.

5] This is a carefully planned and thoroughly implemented genocide by the army. Wiranto is involved, and took part in planning sessions in Jakarta last August.

THE MILITARY PLAN FOR EAST TIMOR

[1] What is the Military Plan?

Is still in operation and consists of four elements:

a) Kill particular people - there are death lists - and particular groups of people. These are the intellectual elite and anybody with administrative/governmental experience. Groups of people targeted: a) University students and more generally any young men. b) NGO staff and anybody employed by UNAMET (UN); c) CNRT (pro-independence party preparing for government); d) Community leaders such as clergy, Sisters and seminarians.

When the young seminarians (high school) were being led out of the Balide, Dili, seminary on 6-12 September, after a last minute reprieve form slaughter, and after receiving absolution (prayers for the dying) from a priest, they were taunted with the remark: "political elite". (Former seminarians have played an important part in all political parties and persuasions over the past 25 years.) Guns were held at their brows, and knives under their throats, as they were escorted to evacuation trucks.

1. Evacuate by force everybody in the 8 Districts in the western half of East Timor. A figure mentioned by the East Timor army commander Colonel Muis on Sept. 3rd before the vote announcement was 250,000 people to be deported.

2. This evacuation was planned to facilitate the partitioning of East Timor. The eight western Districts would remain in Indonesia thus securing for Indonesia (Soeharto's economic empire) much of the Timor Gap oil. Soeharto and his cronies own around 45% of the land surface of East Timor (apart from land equivalent to the size of the whole of Jawa throughout Indonesia). The five eastern Districts would form the new independent East Timor, a country without the marble, coffee and offshore oil of the eight western districts and with a population of less than 300,000. The eight western Districts are 1. Oecusse, 2. Covalima (Suai), 3. Bobonaro (Maliana), 4. Liquica, 5. Ermera, 6. Aileu, 7. Ainaro, 8. Manufahi (Same).

The five Eastern districts are 1. Dili, 2. Manatuto, 3. Baucau, 4. Lautem (Los Palos), 5.

Viqueque.

3. Trash Dili and all major towns, most particularly in the western part of Eat Timor. This includes offices, barracks, houses, shops, livestock and crops. Also villages. It is a total Scorched Earth policy. It continued right up to the time that the Indonesian Army was "cooperating" with UN forces, when TNI troops burned barracks and military posts under the very nose of the UN troops (Sept. 25). A snub to the UN, but also an indication of the totality of the Scorched Earth policy.

[2] Has this Military Plan been successful?

1. Killing. There have been many killings, however the intellectual elite has for the most part escaped - to the hills and outside East Timor. The killing is still continuing, and will probably continue for a long time to come. None of the intellectual elite should relax its guard. Moreover the world should urgently focus on this summary execution of forced deportees in West Timor and intimidation and worse in other Indonesian provinces.

2. The evacuation has been outstandingly successful. It was quick, efficient, ruthless and is now almost complete. The planned target of 250,000 refugees has been achieved. A tribute to army and government planning.

3. Partitioning. The partitioning at this point in time (Sept. 25) seems to have been achieved. The eight western districts are predominantly in the hands of the militias, backed by the Indonesian Army. They will have to face both Falintil, some of whom are in mountain cantonments within the western districts and the UN troops who have yet to venture into these areas. So far so good.

4. Trashing and scorched earth. This has, like the deportations, been outstandingly successful. The total obliteration of Dili and other towns prompted one observer to suggest that it will take 5 years to rebuild.

The mass deportation of a quarter of a million people and the scorched earth policy have been outstandingly successful. Absolutely remarkable - all in just three weeks. (Sept. 5 - 25)

[3] What is the purpose of this military plan?

1. To retain East Timor - or its western natural resource-rich section - for the Soeharto clan.

2. To save face; to justify 24 years of occupation; the army never loses; revenge for Timorese rejection of wider-ranging autonomy.

3. To show other independence-seeking provinces (Irian Jaya and Aceh especially) that they will not succeed. If they try, they will be punished (deportation, burning and plunder) and the army will win in the long term (as they did in Irian Jaya in the 1960s and may still do so in East Timor when the West (UN) is tired).

4. Genocide by smashing East Timorese national identity, historical ties with Portugal and Macau, the Catholic identity of both culture and people.

Fighting against the UN

1. Indonesian aim:

i. The militias currently control large parts of the 8 districts in the western part of East Timor the Falintil pockets in the hills are the exception. These districts constitute about half the geographic area of East Timor. The militias aim to keep these 8 districts and effectively make them part of Indonesia. the Governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, said in Kupang on 23 September: "The focus should now be on integrating the 8 Districts into West Timor". (the task of the UN (and Falintil?) Is to win these areas for an independent East Timor).

ii. The Military Plan is still in operation, but has had to be adapted to take into account the arrival of UN troops. Instead of an easy integration of the 8 western districts into Indonesia, now these districts must be fought for, and won back for Indonesia.

2. National Unity Front.

i. A meeting was held in Kupang on 19 or 20 September. The meeting was under the leadership of the TNI (Indonesian army) and all East Timorese militias attended. The result of the meeting was that a new, expanded and united Front has been formed, consisting of all the former militias. It is called "Front Persatuan Bangsa" (FPB) - National Unity Front.
ii. The former militias (called PPI) have been merged into FPB and now no longer technically exist as separate entities. It is likely they still have local loyalties, based on their separate barracks in Kupang, and regional languages in East Timor.
iii. Joao Tavares is the Commander. Eurico Guterres is Deputy Commander.
iv. The former civilian/political arm of the militias still seems to exist. It is Forum Pesatuan Demokrasi dan Keadilan (United Front for Democracy and Justice - FPDK). The head of FPDK is sitll Domingos M.D. Soares, the former District Head of Dili. The spokesperson for FPDK is Basilio Araujo, and it was he who announced the formation and aim of the new National Unity Front.
v. Who are the troops of this new army - National Unity Front?
a). The old militias.
b). New militia recruits. Many of these are East Timorese forced evacuees, who were then sent to Atambua for training as militias.
c). Possibly ex ABRI (army) personnel.
d). Indonesian mercenaries. Places mentioned in Indonesia as sources for the mercenaries are Jung Pandang (Sulawesi), Bima (Sumbawa - West Nusa Tenggara) and Java, the first two being strongly Islamic areas. A "jihad" has been declared against the UN and presumably against the new East Timorese government. One report states that over 90,000 have signed up for the jihad.
vi. How many FPB troops are there? One report says 56,000. ?
vii. Who is organising the militias? Clearly the army, almost certainly the two best trained and competent branches of the army, namely Kostrad (Soeharto's old command) and Kopassus (Soeharto's son-in-law's old command). Both American trained. Both have been in East Timor protecting Soeharto's interests for many years.
viii. where is the headquarters? It is difficult to be precise. The HQ for the successful deportation exercise was in Atambua (near the border) and clearly this is still the forward military base for training and military operations. In addition the army command for East Timor, namely Korem 164 which was in Dili for over 20 years, is in the process of moving to Maumere (the original plan was Ende) a town of 40,000) on the north coast. Flores is the neighbouring island to Timor and part of the Provinces of East Nusa Tenggara (West Timor, Flores, Sumba). The army command is not being relocated (why relocate?) In Kupang the Provincial capital of 25,000 but in Flores. Thus, possibly the headquarters for the National Unity Front of army and militias will be in Maumere, Atambua and maybe Kupang.

3. Where does the financial support come from? It cannot come through offical army budget, but will no doubt come through a special account controlled by the army. Two sources of funds have been mentioned in Indonesia:
i. Tutut, Soeharto's eldest daughter, who has many business interests in East Timor including coffee and marble and sandalwood, has been reported as having given Rp.3000 million to the war chest to fight UN / East Timor. If true, it is logical to assume that other members of the Jakarta elite who have interests in East Timor such as other members of the Cendana family (Soeharto himself, his youngest son Tommy Utomo) also former military commanders (now billionaires from East Timorese concessions and monopolies) such as General Benny Murdani (an unofficial advisor to opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri) have also given large sums.
ii. Ex-General Prabowo (son-in-law of Soeharto, formerly in Dili and commander of Kopassus) has direct links with Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron one of the more vicious of the

militias). They trained near Bogor in West Jawa with Prabowo's money. He also has the loyalty of many current Kopassus (Special Command) leaders, who spearheaded the wave of terror in East Timor since early 1999. Prabowo is a man of enormous wealth and also has excellent connexions with wealthy Moslems overseas (he fled to Jordan to avoid trial in 1998). When he was in charge of Kopassus in 1997, he financed Kopassus' new weaponry from overseas, without any need to be subject to Indonesian army finances. At the time Kopassus was called 'an army within the army', a sort of private army. It would be naive to imagine that Prabowo is not one of the main sponsors of the new war.

4. Presence of militias, and pro-Jakarta forces in Kupang.

i. All the militias have separate bases, messes, and barracks in Kupang.

ii. The ex-Governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, has rented a smart house in Jalan Walter Mangunside, Walikota, Kupang, but is reported to be buying a house in Tarus, some 20 km out of Kupang on the main road to the east (Atambua etc.)

iii. Eurico Guterres has rented a house behind the Catholic Cathedral in Kupang.

TNI, Police and militias - the dynamics.

1. TNI and Police

i. The army and navy are at loggerheads.

ii. The police and army hate each other. These differences are possibly due to police and navy dislike of army excesses, but more likely to be the result of jealousy that the army is arrogant and superior and gets more resources and prestige. It has, remember, run the resource-rich country for over thirty years.

iii. The police in Kupang admit privately that they cannot control the militias and the army. They cannot disarm the militias, but only appeal to them not to unduly disturb the peace. It is certain that the police know fully what the militias are doing, but ignore it unless excessive. This is the same as the police inertia in East Timor before and after the Referendum on 30th August.

2. The Militias

i. The militias are scared of the army. They are becoming more fully the surrogate army for the TNI. The army insisted on the forced evacuations form East Timor, but many of the militias (East Timorese themselves) did not agree, but had to go along with it.

ii. There is speculation in Kupang that Joao Tavares and Eurico Guterres might one day be killed by the army, who will blame the UN forces for doing it. (Guterres himself divulged this when speaking in his mother tongue - Tetum - at one of the camps.)

3. Drugs

Some militias have been using drugs, e.g. Aitarak and Besi Merah Putih (ex-General Prabowo's group). The drug used is called colloquially "obat anjing gila" - mad dog pills, or rabies pills. Others have not used drugs, eg Halilintar (lightening). This rather points to the possibility that there is a difference between the hard-line militias, who are under the direct control of the army or other members of he Jakarta elite, form whom they obtain drugs, and the softer militias who wanted integration but were less inclined to indulge in drugs and massacres.

4. Probowo v. Wiranto

i. Two months after Wiranto became the Commander of the Defence Forces and the Minister of Defence in March 1998, he had General Prabowo investigated by a special army tribunal, which found him guilty of improper practices relating to the May riots and April disappearances of students in Jakarta. Prabowo was discharged form the army. There had been enmity between the two men previously, but this exacerbated this personal hostility, so that it has become a permanent feature of the Jakarta elite power play. It is likely that some of the militia activity in East Timor has been influenced by this division, and has led to divided loyalties and the lack of

a single command.

ii. Each general has supporters, but it is impossible to call one group hard-line, and the other soft-line. Both are hard-line, and exist for the sake of personal ambition. Prabowo is known for his ruthlessness, and has the support of Major-General Zacky Anwar, who is the architect of the plan implemented in 1998 to set Timorese against Timorese.

The Future of Eastern Indonesia

1. An undercover plan

i. There is constant talk in Timor and Flores, both of which are parts of NTT Province, of a plan relating to eastern Indonesia. In this regard, eastern Indonesia refers mainly to the provinces of NTT and Maluku (Ambon), but includes parts of other nearby provinces, particularly where there are pockets of Christianity.

ii. The plan is one of destabilisation through Islamisation.

iii. The main executor of the plan is the army. They make use of Moslem aspirations, and thus Moslems, especially those on the extreme right, are drawn into the disputes.

iv. The common feature of the parts of eastern Indonesia in question is that they are predominantly Christian, both Protestant and Catholic. However there are significant minorities of Moslems.

2. Destabilisation

i. Indonesia is 85% Moslem, 5% Protestant and 4% Catholic. The Protestants and Catholics enjoy influence in Indonesia far in excess of their numerical strength.

ii. There are sufficient fanatical religionists to make it possible to incite one religion against the other, especially if bribe money is involved. Religion often (not always) follows ethnic lines. Sometimes these "ethnic religious entities" follow, more or less, economic lines. Thus, the common perception that Chinese-Indonesians are Christian are rich (in fact the richest Indonesians are the army generals and their cronies).

iii. Since before the stepping-aside of Soeharto on 21st May 1998, and more particularly after his departure, there have been inter-religious incidents throughout Indonesia. Eastern Indonesia has been one major location for these contrived incidents.

iv. Certain common features of these incidents are:

a) Muslim and Christians incited to fight each other (500 Churches and schools burnt; hosts desecrated at feast days during worship).

b) The incidents occur in areas where previously there had been generations of harmony.

c) There is no definable reason arising from the local context.

d) There has been no solution or settlement to the incidents. This has led to three of the five court houses in Flores being ransacked by frustrated crowds within a 12 month period in the mid-1990s.

e) It is generally known that the incidents are the work of outsiders. Instigators are sent in.

f) The main suspect is the army. Direct links to Prabowo and his father-in-law Soeharto are often mentioned.

3. Why Destabilisation?

i. To lead to the army re-establishing its control (dictatorship) in Jakarta.

ii. To establish Martial Law or a State of Emergency in certain provinces such as East Nusa Tenggara (West Timor, Flores, Sumba) or throughout Indonesia.

iii. Positioning large numbers of troops in NTT near the border with East Timor, thus facilitating undercover destabilisation in East Timor, and the maintenance of Indonesian control over the western part of East Timor.

4. Examples of Incidents

i. Church buildings (churches, schools, convents) burnt in Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi in

1997. Around 500 church buildings burnt down.
ii. Moslem attack Christians in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan in late 1997.
iii. Muslims attending Catholic worship (Eucharist) on major feast days and taking communion and then publicly destroying/desecrating the host (rubbing it on his genitals etc.) Dozens of incidents in Flores and Timor from 1994-96. No court cases were conclusive leading to riots and destruction of court houses in Ruteng, Bajawa, Ende and Maumere. In Maumere the youth controlled the town for two days before army reinforcements were flown in and youth were arrested at midnight, tortured and imprisoned.
iv. On 30th November 1998 a protest in Kupang was infiltrated resulting in the destruction of 12 Mosques as well as houses of non-Timorese (Muslim) successful traders (from Sulawesi).
v. Muslims and Christians have been set against each other in Ambon, Maluku. Migrants from Sulawesi were outnumbering the local population. Army ships took the migrant families back to Sulawei (Ujung Pandang), left the women and children there, armed the men and shipped them back to Ambon to fight.
vi. A small example of subtle destabilisation is the recent practice at the Nursing Academy in Ende, Flores. Here, in this mostly Christian island (80%), the Academy allowed Muslims to wear the jilbab but banned Catholic Sisters form wearing their religious habit. The Christian Director of Health (July 1999) explained that this was the result of an order from up the line.
vii. On 17th Sept 1999 one East Timorese militia youth from Aitarak was seen in Kupang wearing a black T shirt, with these words on the back - Timor Timur islamisasi 2000 (East Timor - Islamised by the year 2000).
viii. A jihad was declared on 18th September against the presence of foreigners on what is said to be Indonesian soil, namely East Timor. The presence of the UN troops is being ~~used as a ploy~~ to proclaim an Islam v Christian battle. The infidels are the East Timorese, the UN and other westerners who have shamed Indonesia.
ix. The aim in eastern Indonesia, particularly in the province of NTT, could be to make it into a battleground, as has occurred in East Timor. Ambon has already been successfully divided against itself. Such religious conflict in NTT, which adjoins East Timor, will justify a strong military presence in NTT. Thus the army's presence on the border of East Timor will be camouflaged by the need for it to "mediate" in NTT, "settling" (ie provoking) Muslim-Christian disputes. The future of eastern Indonesia looks bleak. This should be of interest to the SVD (Divine Word Missionaries).

MILITARY CRIMES

East Timor September 4-25 September

a. Death and ill-treatment

1. Bishop Belo was ill-treated in the garden of his house. He was prodded with a rifle, shouted at, made to raise his hand in an oath of loyalty to the Jakarta regime, threatened with death. This happened in front of the thousand or so who had taken refuge in the bishop's house. When a marksman had him in his sights, a soldier (a Timorese) clasped the bishop and said to the marksman: "We can fight it out but leave our bishop alone." Only then was the bishop removed and flown by police helicopter to Baucau. An Australian Hercules then flew him to Darwin.
2. One deportee in Kupang says that when he and his family came form Dili to Kupang by ship on 11th September, ten people were thrown overboard by the militias. This story has been corroborated by deportees in Flores.
3. There are many stories of people being thrown into the sea. The stories can be assembled into the following categories:
i. Thrown into the sea alive. ii. Dead bodies assembled on land, then taken out and dumped in the sea. iii. Killed on board ship, then thrown into the sea.

These events happened as follows:
i. Off the East Timor coast, eg Baucau, Manatuto, Batugade. ii. En route between Dili and Kupang. iii. En route between Kupang and other places. eg Ende (Flores).
4. Another report: x saw a 19 year-old girl who had her font burnt from forehead to toes, including her whole face. She was in Kupang, but came form near Ermera (East Timor), here the whole house was burnt and to escape she had to run through the flames. In this incident 6 young children ran form the back of the house and have not been seen again. The girl could not talk because her face was taut with burns. She was in a Catholic clinic in Kupang with her mother and father. There were plans for her to go to Jakarta. A priest in Jakarta is paying.
5. Babies in Becora, Dili, were killed in a number of ways, according to stories of deportees in Kupang: i. Smashed against the wall till they were quivering; ii. Thrown into fires; iii. Piled up in heaps then stabbed with long machete knives. Sometimes these methods were used together. For instance, a baby who was not completely dead because of the stabbing, was then thrown into a fire.
6. Separation of families.
i. There are many stories of deportee families being separated. Most forcefully displaced people are women and children. The men have either gone to the hills, been forced to join the militias or eliminated. This happened at Batugade, near the West Timor - East Timor border, and at Atambua. The men were forced to become militias, to fight against the UN troops, and the women and children were sent on to refugee camps. Children in Kupang tell vivid stories of this separation of their fathers and mothers. Young children are being palmed out for adoption.
b. Looting and destruction
1. Over 100 houses have been burned in the East Timor enclave of Oecusse. 40,000 out of a population of 56,000 have left or been evacuated.
2. Militias stole safes from banks and private houses in East Timor, took them to Kupang and have had them cut open. One car workshop in Kupang apologised (20th September) that they could not do any repairs to customer cars, because they were too busy cutting open large numbers of "army" safes.
3. Both SSpS Sisters and Carmelite Sisters went back from Atambua to Becora (Dili) and Maubara respectively and found their houses wrecked and all possessions taken. This was during 8-18 September.
4. There has been major looting by army and militias. truck loads of TVs, fridges, washing machines, furniture have been arriving from East Timor. A huge number of large trucks have been seen passing villages in West Timor on the way to Kupang. The army has opened a number of stores in Kupang as out-lets selling their war booty. Some have been taken by ferry and land through Flores at night (from Ende to Labuan Bajo and so to Sumbawa, Lombok, Bali, Java).
5. Some UN vehicles have been seen driving around Kupang with groups of Timorese militias inside.
6. At Ermera all medicine were taken by the militias, with one Sister was trying to treat a patient. No medicines were left.
c. Further reports on the genocide.
1. Liquica massacre, 6 April 1999. it was reported at the time that the number of dead was 40. There were 40 names sent to Darwin. The army said that the number was much lower. Sr. Idalia, who at the time was at Maubara, near Liquica, said that the figure was over 100, and probably closer to 150. Spoke to her on 23rd September. Sr. Idalia is an experienced Sister who has been in East Timor since 1981. The bodies were thrown into a lake and others taken to a beach, on the night of April 6-7.
2. Suai Massacre, May 1999, this massacre occurred soon after the Liquica massacre. Refugees were executed gradually, group by group. There was no open one-off slaughter. The number of

deaths is said to be between 400 and 500.

3. Suai Massacre, 6th September 1999. early reports said that the number of dead was 100 or 250. Rui Lopes, a long time Suai resident who was on the pro-Jakarta side but may have changed his position, for he is now in Macao, said on TV on 22nd September 1999 that it was likely that 425 people were killed. He had been a party to some of the planning. NB Suai area is thought to have suffered the largest/widest massacres.

West Timor 4-25 September

a. Death and Ill-treatment.

1. Refugee/deportee pregnant mothers form Covalima who were camping on the side of the road in Belu District, West Timor, near a village between Kade and Halilulik, were taken by militias/military in a dawn raid, and had their fonts slit open (from breast to abdomen), while they were still alive. the baby inside was pulled out and thrown away, then the mothers had their throats slit. Some of the headless bodies were then tided up on posts and trees for others to see. (These incidents occurred during the fortnight 4-18 September. They were relatd by a Sister from Belu District, resident in Kupang who got the stories form the many hundreds of refugees/deportees who live in that area.)

2. There is a camp of 5000 Oecusse refugees/deportees at Oelfua, which is on the West Timor side of the East Timor (Oecusse) border. Fr. Andre, the local priest said on 24th September in Kupang (where he had come to collect rice) that 6 men are taken from the camp each night and executed. The method of death is unknown. This is clearly for the sake of intimidation. As this report is being written (25th September) nightly deaths are still occurring. There is no protection, no authority to whom to turn.

3. Soldiers and militias regularly take young girls from the refugee camps for rape.

4. Young men are taken form the camps, then trnsported to Atambua for training to be militias against the UN.

5. People telephone convents in Kupang to ask for refugee children. Two requests were for 4 children each "by later this afternoon". The Sisters made excuses. It is thought that the caller was a middleman (sympathetic to the army) who would then sell the children to army officers or others, and the children would be "adopted" kin Java or elsewhere. This is truly genocide. Past experience of this military practice suggests that these children are often used as servants and then when older thrown out.

6. Army and militia trucks speed along the road form Dili to Kupang, pushing others off the road by their speed, and by using the "klaxon" loud and long. If frustrated, the people in the back start shooting into the air.

7. In one village between Soe and Niki-Niki, one primary school boy going to school was slow in getting off the road. He was hit by the army truck which did not stop. The boy was killed. During 13-19 September.

8. In Kupang at Maulafa, on 20th September an army truck with uniformed soldiers in the back, passed a university student on his motorbike, and pushed him of the road. He was anry so he hit the side of the truck with his hand. Then the army retaliated by chasing him. He rode home but they followed him and informed his parents that they would burn down the house unless they received Rp.500,000 immediately. The parents managed to rustle the money together form neighbours.

9. During the week of 7-15 September militias entered refugee camps and other church places where refugees were. They cam in during day or night, without invitation, or accompaniment by a Sister. They wore plain clothes and looked as if bent on evil. They were looking for wanted people. This activity later stopped. Probably as a result of NTT government pressure.

10. Children sit traumatised inside the church hall at Maria Assumpta Church, Kupang. they will not play outside. One old an came to help with chopping wood for the kitchen saying, "I want

to cry but I can't".

Effects of East Timor issue on life in West Timor

a. Kupang is extremely crowded. There is a feeling of streaming humanity passing by, rather like Mumbai or Calcutta. The roads are clogged up with trucks, cars, motorbikes and people. There are many vehicles and motorbikes with DF number plates - the East Timor registration.

b. Primary schools and Junior High Schools in Belu District are not operating because they have been taken over by refugees a camps. This applies to Atambua the District capital, and to outlying areas. Parents are angry because their children are not being educated, and are sitting around at home.

c. Homes near some of the refugee/deportee camps in Belu District (West Timor) have been burnt. This is possibly so that there is no fraternisation between refugees and locals, or so that the refugees cannot get food form the locals.

d. There are insufficient supplies in Kefamenanu and Atambua hospitals.

Refugees/Deportees - Location, plight, needs.

Top Priorities

a. Protection, as this report is being written, refugees/deportees are being killed. Thus absolute need for immediate presence of Red Cross, High Commission for Refugees with Peacekeepers in West Timor to arrange a safe corridor for repatriation to East Timor.

b. Supplies (in order of priority) 1. Water and sanitation; 2. Medicines; 3. Non-rice foodstuffs (eg vegetables, fish)

Plight and Needs

a. Protection.

People are still being killed. Those killed are either taken from the camps and killed, or if they are non-camp refugees, are killed wherever they are found. Other people are on the 'wanted' list, so are in danger of being killed. Militias are still searching for these people, so they are in a state of great fear. They move around constantly, never staying long in one place.

Two initiatives must be taken as a matter of urgency:

1. The UN must expand its protection to West Timor. they need to negotiate urgently with Indonesia to provide firstly protection and secondly humanitarian relief.

2. Large sums of money are needed to evacuate people to Australia, safer areas of Indonesia and other countries.

b. Water and Sanitation

This is the highest-priority, after protection. Disease is likely to spread through the camps very soon. Some camps are in reasonable condition, eg GOR, others are dirty and disease-ridden, eg Noelbaki.

c. Food Relief

1. Refugees/deportees are being kept alive with rice, which generally speaking is supplied by the Red Cross, the local government or the church. The main food is vegetables, for the sake of nutrition.

2. The Indonesian government in Jakarta (Social Department) has promised money which they say is sufficient for 100,000 refugees for 8 weeks. This probably only amounts to the provision of rice, and does not include other foodstuffs or medicines. Clearly this provision is inadequate in every way.

3 Church groups who have fed refugees in Kupang for 2 weeks have received no assistance from the government or Red Cross whatsoever.

4. Where the local government assists the refugees, it is commonly with the produce of local people, collected by the local government. The local government does not always dig into its own pocket.

Refugees/deportees are mixed on common sites, pro-integration and pro-independence. This

makes people very scared and suspicious they refuse to give their names, in case others hear. It is a continuation of the terror and fear they have experienced for months.

GOR (Sports Hall) within the town of Kupang at Oebufu (near bishop's house). This is the showcase. The people are from Dili. They have been given adequate supplies by the NTT Provincial government, the Red Cross and the Church. this includes food, sleeping gear and cooking utensils. Families cook individually, people can come and go as they wish. Other camps are far worse.

Numbers and locations

1. How many refugees/deportees have come out of East Timor?

Probably 250,000. The list below from the local Indonesian government authorities gives 202,000 as the number of refugees as of 22nd September, but later on 24th, this number was increased to 212,000.

A. Province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) which includes West Timor.

All the areas mentioned below are "Districts" in the NTT province, except the town of Kupang (administratively equivalent to a district/Kabupaten). The figures are quoted in the local daily "Pos Kupang" (22nd September 1999, p.11) and give their source aas the Local NTT government, Satkorlak PB NTT.

Kupang Town 23,575. Kupang District 35,541, TTS 2,423. TTU 19,818. Belu 115,904.

Other parts of NTT province (mostly in Flores)

Alor 2,464. Flores Timur 802. Sikka 358. Manggarai 209. Ngada 170. Total 202,542.

B. Numbers in other parts of Indonesia.

Bali 425 (counted by Catholic Church 20th September)

Other provinces an estimated 10,000. Details below.

2. Names of camps/locations.

There are at least 30 camps in West Timor. In and around Kupang Noelbaki 30 km out of Kupang. Mostly, no all, pro-Jakarta. Naibonat GOR 4,000 showcase camp where visitors are taken.

Carmelite Monastery 101. RVM convent Walikota 463. Fed twice a day because the people will not split into groups to cook through fear. RVM convent Oelnasi about 50. PRR convent 50. SVD house none.

Atambua area

Atapupu Paroki Sadi (many sick) Haliwen (many sick) Salore, Silawan, Aula SVD Nenuk around 1,000 - eat alone not with the community. Nela Parish.

Note: from Halilulik to Betun the road is full of refugees and camps (official and unofficial). From Atapupu to the East Timor - West Timor border the roadside is full of refugee camps.

Central West Timor: SoE - stadium. Naen 8,000 ex-Oecusse. Oelfua 5,000 ex-Oecusse.

Resettlement from West Timor to other provinces.

A. This was to have occurred 10 days after arrival in West Timor.

B. NTT government plans exist - copies have been sighted which state that 125,000 people will return to East Timor and that 125,000 will be resettled in other parts of NTT. The map shows where the new resettlement sites are throughout the 12 Districts of NTT. Total 250,000. Clearly this is a plan from before the deportation started.

C. It is not known if this plan will be (fully) implemented. First, it is possible that the 125,000 returnees will not be allowed, or able, to return. They are hostages to developments in East Timor. secondly, thee is evidence which indicates that plans are in place to evacuate refugees currently in West Timor, not to other parts of NTT but to other parts of Indonesia. see below.

Known destinations of refugees/deportees according to pictures on Indonesian TV and in newspapers.

1. Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi). 2. Surabaya (Java). Yogyakarta (Java). 4. Jakarta. 5. Bali. 6.

Kaljmantan. 7. Irian Jaya.

A visit to the Transmigration Training Centre, Kupang on 24th September revealed that two East Timorese groups had left that day by boat for two different destinations - Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. Whilst at the Transmigration Training Centre, another bus was just pulling out with "Transmigration Group" written on the front, and about 30 passengers inside. The whole of the parking area in front of the Training Centre was filled with personal belongs and large bales of goods, wrapped in sacking. They looked like official transmigration stores.

Life in another province.

Life for refugees has never been easy. These are some of the problems:

1. The transmigrants do not know the local language, and the locals do not know theirs.
2. They are often made to feel like outsiders.
3. The locals sometimes resent the transmigrants taking their land.
4. The transmigrants do not understand the system of farming in the new area.
5. The seasons may well differ.
6. They do not get the support promised by the government.
7. The farming land is barren, and needs to be cleared of rocks or jungle.
8. The transmigrants may be stigmatised for being responsible for the loss of East Timor to Indonesia.
9. They will forever be Indonesians and never again regarded as East Timorese.
10. They will lose their Timorese culture.
11. They may never again return to East Timor.

Repatriation to East Timor

A. IT is reported that, under the agreement which allowed the UN to enter East Timor provisions were made for the repatriation of refugees.

B. This may well not happen. Currently refugees/deportees from East Timor to West Timor are being given the choice between:

1. Remaining in West Timor as refugees, with the implication that they will continue to live in camps, in hunger, and in fear of militia intimidation and possible death, and
2. Going as a transmigrant to another part of Indonesia, with the promise of land, a house, security, money for seeds, and tools for working the land. Naturally many East Timorese have already chosen the transmigration option. Many others will follow in the coming weeks.

C. Indonesia will be able to argue that these people are willing transmigrants, and are no longer refugees. The refugees will have forfeited their chance of repatriation, and the Un will have no right to investigate their whereabouts, or give them humanitarian assistance.

D. It is naive to imagine that many of the East Timorese refugees/deportees will return to East Timor.